Showing posts with label NAEB. Show all posts
Showing posts with label NAEB. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 1, 2019

92. New Two-Tier Pricing and Quality Control at Kopakama

May 1, 2019
by Ruth Ann Church
The first of May is "Labor Day" in Rwanda - the day when workers, and good work ethics are celebrated. When Ruth Ann was visiting Kopakama on May 1, 2017, she witnessed an employee meeting where they voted on the "employee of the year" as part of the celebration.

This makes May 1 a good day to commemorate a historic shift in coffee policy that has happened this year - 2019, that will significantly benefit farmers, and coffee buyers, for years to come. Kopakama, as a single cooperative, decided to implement two-tier pricing at all of its 70 collection sites, and then the entire nation did!

Kopakama made the decision to shift from "one-price for all cherry" to a two-tier system back in August 2018, the "down season" in coffee in Rwanda. The cooperative's board of directors therefore had time to sensitize and inform the member community (area farmers) that this significant change in pricing and quality control was coming with the 2019 season.

NAEB letter recommending floating.
The National Agricultural Export Development Board (NAEB) sets policy and regulates the coffee industry across all of Rwanda. They issued a statement (see left) to all coffee industry stakeholders on February 28, 2019. In part 3, the letter recommends  that "all washing stations should implement the floating system."

At Kopakama, this means a four-step process.
1. Farmers arriving with cherry must HAND-SORT their cherry, separating out the good ones and bad ones.
2. The "good pile" of cherries is submerged in a large basin of water with a net. The floaters are skimmed off the top (these are light-weight, undesirable cherries), and added to the waste pile from step 1.
3. The "waste pile" is weighed.
4. The kilograms of waste are subtracted from the total kilograms delivered, which was taken at the very start of the process. The TWO WEIGHTS are recorded in different books, and TWO PRICES are paid: a high price for the dense good cherry, and a low price for the light-weight "floaters."

In this way, farmers who are implementing best practices during the growing season and during harvest (picking only the ripe, dense cherry) are rewarded. Those with less motivation or training quickly see the benefit of improving their practices so that next time they arrive at the collection site they can be paid more.
The importance of a QC step before the farmer is paid - from the slide Artisan presented at an SCA Boston lecture. 

Images of Kopakama's cherry floating process taking place in February 2019.

The floating practice is dependent on getting the two prices right. The "high price" must be "high enough".  Farmers who invest time to bring good cherry must walk away better than the farmers who get paid the "average price" for all cherry. (Otherwise farmers will avoid collection sites requiring floating and paying two prices.)






Tuesday, February 27, 2018

80. What a 240 Cherry Floor Price Means in Rwanda

Feb.27, 2018
Coffee cherry in Rwanda
What does a 240 cherry floor price mean in Rwanda? More poverty for coffee farmers. NAEB has announced a 240 RWF/KG cherry floor price (farmgate price) for coffee cherry for the 2018 season despite research showing that around 25%, one fourth, of Rwanda's coffee farmers will be losing money on every coffee cherry they sell. (See  Figure 1 below.)  When viewing this figure, keep in mind that the threshold used for "profit" here is any amount above 0. The data is credible, as it is based on a 1024 sample survey (AGLCa, 2016), which included estimating cost of production for coffee at 177 RWF/KG cherry (AGLCb, 2016). Most businesses, including the exporters who are pressuring NAEB to keep the cherry price low, would go out of business if profit levels fall below 20%. The red bars in the Figure below would be much higher if we assumed farmers had the right to have 20-30% margins. Then Figure 1 would show that nearly half of Rwanda's farmers are "in the red" at a floor price of 240.
Figure 1: Percent of Coffee Farmers Making Above 0 Profit at Various Cherry Prices

So the 2018 season begins with these "barely getting by" prices for farmers, forced to be this low by exporters who will gorge themselves on 50% margins. Meanwhile, the exporters will publicize their exciting 'investments' in water projects to improve waste water treatment at one coffee washing station, and 'investments' in a training project that brings cows to smallholders. These 'investments' will be so exciting they will end up in articles on the covers of glossy coffee trade press magazines and even in Harvard Business Review case studies about "social enterprises" doing the right thing for poor coffee farmers in Rwanda.

Please don't be fooled. The powerful in Rwanda are hungry enough to eat every coffee farmers' lunch. They would rather invest in projects on the fringe, than work to improve their marketing and sell more specialty coffee at higher prices. They cannot see their way to paying a few cents more, just $.19/lb. green coffee, to ensure that farmers are motivated to plant seedlings, prune trees, conserve their water and buy a cow if they would like to.

Please don't be fooled by projects and trainings. 57% of Rwanda's coffee trees are owned by commercially oriented farmers with .5 hectares or more planted with coffee. Many of them could increase their yields by two or three times this season -- if it is commercially viable to do so.  They know how. But they choose not to because with cost of production at 177/KG cherry, 240 RWF/KG cherry means 64 RWF/KG cherry net income, or a 26% gross margin and they have better options in banana, livestock and other farming businesses. Many will use low-input strategies or neglect the coffee trees completely because they can afford to transition to other business opportunities.

The smallest farmers, with an average of 180 - 200 trees, will not be so lucky. They will suffer yet another year of losses for all their effort on their coffee trees. For them, a training may minimize their costs per unit of cherry produced and therefore minimize their losses. But leaving the coffee and using the same amount of time to pick potatoes as a day-laborer would probably bring more cash into the household.

You might ask "why?" Why do companies implement projects and trainings, but refuse to pay $.07/KG cherry more, (equal to +$.42/KG green coffee, or +$.19/lb green coffee) for a supply of quality, fully-washed coffee? For some it is greed to make a few pennies more this year that drives such decisions. For other exporters it is short-sightedness. Despite the research (AGLCc, 2016) they do not understand that their insistence on cheap cherry means death of a vibrant option for increases in yields and supplies of high-quality cherry, plus rural development in Rwanda. Meanwhile, they keep their options open to move over to Ethiopia or Tanzania once Rwanda's commercially viable coffee farmers have all pulled out their trees.

Pennies -- they are unwilling to pay pennies of investment in the coffee farmers via the coffee cherry price, (i.e. the farmgate price).

Specialty buyers of Rwandan coffee should be outraged at the downward spiral the 240 price can precipitate: lower prices, leading to lower yields, leading to lower motivation from commercially motivated Rwandans living in rural areas. Rwanda was poised to reverse this vicious spiral in the 2017 season. At this time last year NAEB pegged the floor price first at 270, a promising start.  But then they let it decline to 240 later in the season. The weighted average for 2017 was 249. Starting this 2018 season at 240 starts to look like we are headed back to the bad 'ol days of 2015 and 2016. In those years the floor price was 170 and 150 respectively.

If you buy Rwandan coffee, you know the FOB price, (called the export price in our scenario illustrated below, $4.30/KG green). Please, demand to know the farm-gate price from your supplier. Farmers want 300 RWF/ KG cherry. Research (AGLCa, 2016) shows 300 RWF provides sufficient motivation for farmers to invest in best practices, which results in high-yielding plants and more specialty grade coffee. A win-win for all. Any exporter paying less than 300 RWF for coffee bound for the specialty market should explain to you why coffee farmers deserve margins only half the size of exporters (Chart 1 vs. Chart 2 below).

 Chart 1: 240 RWF/KG Cherry

 

Chart 2: 300 RWF/KG Cherry


Tuesday, October 17, 2017

76. Tale of Two Coops: Insights on Determinants of Farmgate Price in Rwanda

Oct. 17, 2017

Rwanda is unique in many ways. Sometimes so unique, that even Rwandans are unable to clearly articulate how "their world" is different from other places in the coffee industry. The farm-gate price in Rwanda is called the "cherry price". Elsewhere in the world, coffee farmers understand that their price is largely determined by the New York "C", the price set daily at a commodity exchange in New York which has little to do with coffee farmers and a lot to do with speculators. In general, a good thing. Commodity trading provides transparency and easily referenced pricing. But a bad thing because, unfortunately, this market does not reflect true costs, especially for "specialty coffee". But let's not go there today. The point here is that this all-pervasive NY "C" price does NOT pervade directly to the farm level in Rwanda!

In Rwanda, the cherry price is determined by another price, the National Agricultural Export and Development Board (NAEB) floor price. It would be fair to say the NAEB floor price is influenced by the NY "C", but it is influenced by many other people, too.  Which people? People who have influence in coffee and politics in Kigali. Notice that definition does not sound like a definition of a "coffee farmer". And therein lies the controversy and challenging transition that is currently underway in Rwanda. The Rwandan cherry floor price determines the fate of 350,000 coffee farmers, and ultimately, the country's foreign exchange earnings, yet up until 2017, the "voice" of the farmer has been absent in its determination.

In the past year I was able to talk to two leaders of cooperatives in two different coffee production regions in Rwanda. The differences in their comments about what determines cherry price illustrates how and why a transition to including farmer "voice" in the politics that determine the NAEB floor price is so important to Rwanda's future. 

Cooperative A:“So many things influence coffee cherry price,” commented Jean Luc TWAKIRE (name changed), managing director of a well-established coffee cooperative in Rwanda. “Factors include whether a farmer is a cooperative member or not, the competitiveness of the region and the strategy of the cooperative itself. I’m willing to pay a high price, because I only buy high quality cherry. I need a high quality output.” Mr. TWAKIRE goes on to share specifics about the type of relationship he has with his buyers. He calls them “permanent” and willing to “reduce their profitability in order to help the cooperative in their sustainability.” In other words, one notices that the type of relationship the cooperative has with the coffee buyers is one critical variable in determining cherry price, on top of the others TWAKIRE mentioned. 
Bringing the coffee to get weighed at a collection site.
 
Where it counts: farmer record shows she has been paid exactly the NAEB floor price - 270 RWF/KG cherry until the floor price was adjusted down to 240 RWF.

Cooperative B: In a different area of Rwanda, the managing director of a different cooperative washing station, also well-established, we’ll call it “Cooperative B” has less “permanent” customers. The director, we’ll call him Theogene HABONIMANA, explains their pricing strategy this way, “we pay the floor price set by NAEB, keeping that first price low, and checking what the other washing stations will pay. Our price should be the same, not different.”  Then, at the end of the season they give the farmers a second payment based on the actual profits the cooperative received. “The second payment is an obligation.”


HABONIMANA and TWAKIRE’s descriptions illuminate how for many farmers, the factor most commonly cited globally as affecting coffee pricing, the NY “C” price, becomes almost irrelevant. Researchers on the Africa Great Lakes Coffee (AGLC) Support Program team have validated that for Rwanda’s 350,000 coffee farmers[1], the determinants of cherry price rest on four key factors:

The interesting point in TWAKIRE's comments (cooperative A), is the fact that for him, the NAEB floor price matters less than his relationships with his customers and the competition with other washing stations. Indeed, the AGLC research team found that while the NAEB floor price is the cherry price in regions where competition is weak (e.g. cooperative B's region), in regions where competition is strong and cooperatives have long-standing relationships with specialty coffee buyers, farmers receive prices around 33% above the floor price every year. "We're used to paying above the NAEB floor price," says TWAKIRE. "That happens every year."

What this means is that NAEB has an especially vital role to play. It is imperative that they continue to use data and evidence to inform decision-making about the floor price.  The data gathered by the AGLC team from a survey of 1024 coffee farmer households, represents, in many respects, "the farmer voice" that is missing at the negotiation table.  That data is time-limited, though. Therefore, NAEB must continue to find ways to keep the negotiations objective and fairly representing the farmers' interests, which in the end, are the interests of the country.




[1] NAEB, 2015 Coffee Census

Monday, March 6, 2017

69. Reducing the Gender Data Gap - IWCA Releases New Estimates

Mar. 6, 2017
Harvesting coffee. Photo credit: R. Church
As chairperson of the IWCA Research Alliance, I'm excited for the latest post on IWCA's blog: Click here.

The blog shares the following new estimates of female coffee producers by country:
Rwanda: 113,846, 32% of total
Costa Rica: 15,450, 34% of the total
El Salvador: 6,700, 33% of total
Guatemala: 4,000 - 7,000, 19 - 22% of total
(Sources detailed below.)

It was surprising to me, and today many others express astonishment, that the number of women in the coffee value chain is not tracked by more organizations. As the IWCA blog shares, the ICO does not track it. Neither does CQI, SCAA, SCAE, NCA, the World Bank, ACDI-VOCA, Technoseve nor any of the other international organizations one might think would be concerned with such estimates. But many national organizations do dedicate resources to this kind of research. 
This portion copied from IWCA's blog:
The IWCA Research Alliance recognized the need and utilizes IWCA's uniquely well-suited volunteer structure for tackling this gender data gap. 
SOURCES: 
  • From Rwanda, IWCA's volunteer Zafarani Uwingabire, identified the number of female producers in the 2015 coffee census report published by Rwanda's National Agricultural Export Development Board (NAEB), which was released in May 2016.
  • From Costa Rica, volunteer Gabriela Soto gathered the estimate from Instituto del Cafe de Costa Rica (ICAFE). As is often the case in research, her "result" raised as many questions as it answered. How valid is this number? Does it include names of women who may be 'registered' as coffee farmers, but in reality are never on the farm? Does it include all the small producers, even if they are not registered? 
  • For Guatemala, volunteer Blanca Castro met with Anacafe and Luisa Fernanda Correa Mancia, one of Anacafe's technicians, shared their current estimates from two different sources. One, from the small producers organization put the percentage of women producers higher than the estimate from the database of registered producers during last harvest 2016/2017.
    Mothers and coffee farmers.
    Photo credit: Higher Grounds Coffee Trading
  • For El Salvador, volunteer Maria Botto, who is a coffee producer herself, dug into her own records from the Consejo (El Salvador's national extension group) to find the figures they published for 2013. The Consejo is in touch with Ms. Botto to share updated numbers later this year.
Acting as the platform in coffee focused on organizing, researching, training and empowering women in coffee, the IWCA has established legal chapters now in 20 producing countries. [Learn more about IWCA's 20 chapters here.] The organization proudly collaborates with many actors across the industry to celebrate International Women's Day on March 8, 2017.
Preparion for fertilizer. Photo credit: R. Church
Supporting families and homes. Photo credit: R. Church
Sorting. Photo credit: R. Church
Transporting. Photo credit: R. Church
Getting paid. Photo credit: R. Church










Thursday, October 15, 2015

38. Project Kick-Off at Lemigo Hotel

Oct. 13, 2015
Lemigo Hotel, Kigali, Rwanda
Participants at the AGLC Kick-Off meeting included top Rwandan and US government officials, NAEB, implementing partners including IPAR, AgroPy, Starbucks, CEPAR, NAEB, GKI, U. of Ngozi, U. of Gitega, U. of Rwnada, MSU.


Tuesday, 13 October, 2015 marked the official launch of the collaborative 3-year Africa Great Lakes Coffee program. The program aims to strengthen the productivity and quality of specialty coffee in the Africa Great Lakes region through research and policy support.

The launch workshop was hosted by the Institute of Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR) and co-hosted by Global Knowledge Initiative (GKI) Michigan State University (MSU) and the University of Rwanda (UR). Amb. George Kayonga the CEO of the National Agricultural Export Development Board (NAEB) gave the welcome. His remarks set the vision for the impact that can be accomplished through the program implementation. Welcome remarks were also delivered by the Executive Director of IPAR, while the key address was from USAID-Rwanda.

Participants at the workshop were drawn from stakeholders in the coffee industry and they included high-level Rwandan and US government officials, the stakeholders in Rwanda’s coffee sector, a representative of USAID Burundi, and Drs. Bonaventure Minani and Gustav Nkurunziza from Ngozi, and Gitega Universities (respectively) who are the implementing partners of the project in
Burundi.


Speakers during the opening ceremony thanked the different stakeholders for their role and support in making the workshop a success. They underscored the timeliness of this workshop and requested for maximum participation from everyone. They also stressed the importance of building policies based on research and evidence.

The New Times, Rwanda's English language newspaper, published an article here: http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-10-14/193485/

A key activity during the day-long program involved all participants collaborating to clarify the research situation in which this project is about to launch. Participants first mapped challenges related to antestia/productivity and related to building an enabling environment to resolve these challenges.  They took the top 18 challenges, and analyzed this - exploring what we know, what we don't know, and what we might be assuming about the challenges. Then, based on what they had learned, the group honed this list of 18 down to 11 "How Might We's" (HMW):

No. 1: HMW understand the most effective pesticide
No. 1: HMW improve knowledge on how to eliminate PTD
No. 1: HMW understand the necessary incentives to decrease PTD?
No. 4: HMW make agronomic guidelines available to farmers
No. 5: HMW improve market access for farmers
No. 5: HMW address risks associated with coffee production
No. 7: HMW encourage full implementation of IPM
No. 7: HMW make enough fertilizer available to all farmers?
No. 9: HMW improve extension services to coffee farmers?
No 10: HMW connect coffee quality to coffee prices?
No. 11: HMW improve the information dissemination system along the coffee value chain? 


Post kick-off meetings followed the kick-off conference on the next day. These were productive, allowing the implementing partners the face-to-face time needed to design the next steps of the many components of this project:

Key components include:
  1. Field research with 64 demonstration plots in each country.
  2. Field research with a baseline, mid-term, and end-line survey of 1024 farmers in 4 districts in each country (the mid-term survey will be a sub-set). 
  3. The two field research components will feed the capacity building (training) and policy development components.